Data Centers and Their Energy Use: Trends in State Capitals

Key Takeaways

• Geothermal shares the clean firm category with only three other technologies: nuclear, natural gas with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and solar or wind paired with long-duration energy storage (LDES).
• Buyers comparing geothermal to solar or unabated natural gas power contracts are comparing different products: one isn’t firm, the other isn’t clean, and both remain cheaper options because they satisfy less of what buyers currently need. 
• Geothermal’s cost premium is real, but so is the value it delivers. Geothermal can reach 90%+ capacity factor, delivering dispatchable clean power around the clock, and it sidesteps the gas turbine manufacturing backlogs and pipeline infrastructure delays slowing other firm power technologies. 
• Geothermal is closer to commercial readiness than most buyers realize. As demand for firm, low-carbon power intensifies, geothermal warrants a serious look alongside nuclear and gas with CCS.

Geothermal is Gaining Traction Despite Its Cost Premium

Hyperscalers, corporate energy buyers, and data center developers face unprecedented pressure to procure clean power. Wind and solar have played a major role in meeting this need, but they are intermittent, and load growth is accelerating and changing. This market pressure is creating bottlenecks that cannot be solved without new grid infrastructure and/or substantial additions of energy storage. Geothermal, which does not suffer from intermittency, has gained tremendous momentum as a challenger to wind and solar, yet it carries one seemingly glaring disadvantage: its cost. 

Yet, major utilities and hyperscalers alike are lining up for geothermal offtake anyway: Southern California Edison and Google have signed separate contracts with Fervo, and Meta has two 150 MW agreements in place with Sage and XGS. These contracts are signaling a growing shift in power markets: not all megawatt-hours are created equal, and the cheapest contracts may no longer contain what buyers truly need. 

Fast, Clean Firm Power: What Buyers Need Today 

In the clean firm power evolution, clean came first. Buyers signed solar and wind power purchase agreements (PPAs) and matched their annual consumption with renewable energy contracts, or offset them with renewable energy certificates (RECs). With lax carbon accounting, solar and wind remain unbeatable on price. But annual emissions tallies conceal something important—a buyer can procure as much renewable electricity as it consumes over a year while still depending on the rest of the grid during the hours when those resources are unavailable. To close that gap, buyers need a source that delivers clean power around the clock, firmly in every hour, on demand. 

Two unforgiving demands have followed since: speed and location. With today’s rapid buildout of new load, a power source needs to come online in time to deliver power when the customer needs it. It is also important to connect near a customer’s location because existing transmission assets are often fully subscribed. Failure on either axis can disqualify a project. However, a contract that can meet all attributes: clean in every hour, firm on demand, quick to deliver, and able to reach the load, might be the best (or only) option available. It is also likely to be considerably more expensive than those annual solar benchmarks that only met the clean condition. 

Four Technologies Make the Clean Firm Power Shortlist

Given this strict set of constraints, what power options should buyers consider? The right set of technologies should aim to solve as many of the aforementioned conditions as possible, and that leaves a fairly tight shortlist: 

1. Solar or Wind paired with Long-Duration Energy Storage (LDES): To achieve the level of reliability that many buyers, including data centers, require, solar or wind would have to be paired with LDES, beyond 4–8 hours, to be able to cover evening hours and remain online during increasingly common extreme weather events. While there are promising LDES technologies on the horizon, most remain expensive and not yet widely commercial. Costs rise significantly compared to a standard solar or wind PPA, and viability varies by location. This will be increasingly competitive as storage costs fall, but not yet a mature firm-power solution at scale.
2. Natural Gas with CCS: With large amounts of unabated natural gas generation coming online, CCS is an attractive option to mitigate a large portion of these emissions while retaining time to power (by building gas first and adding CCS later) and the dispatchability of gas-fired power. On the flip side, CCS is operationally complex, geographically restricted, and - unlike other options here - failure at any point in the CCS chain directly impacts the carbon intensity of power delivered. Gas-fired generation is also reliant on the gas delivery pipeline infrastructure, which may face capacity constraints. Finally, natural gas with CCS is 50% more costly per MWh than unabated firm gas.
3. Nuclear: Nuclear is seeing renewed interest from a wide range of corporate buyers and investors. Conventional nuclear and small modular reactors (SMRs) are attracting funding and offtake deals. While nuclear power holds high potential, long development timelines, high capital costs, and technology risk remain barriers to commercializing the next wave of nuclear technologies. 
4. Geothermal: Geothermal can provide firm, dispatchable, and low-carbon power with capacity factors typically above 90%. Development timelines can be faster than nuclear in regions where resources are already proven, with some projects approaching commercial readiness now. Geothermal technology is still geographically constrained, but enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) are poised to  expand their geographical flexibility by reducing the number of siting variables. 

How to Evaluate the Right Clean Firm Power Technology for Your Project

How do these various options stack up? We compared them across six dimensions:

1. Firmness: how reliably a resource can deliver power on the hour, on demand
2. Carbon: the lifecycle emissions intensity when considering the operational emissions of the generating facility and the broader system carbon impacts required to meet any reliability gaps
3. Time to power: a measure of how long it takes to get from “we need power” to delivery, including interconnection and schedule risk
4. Cost (current): the likely cost of a PPA if signed today
5. Execution risk: a measure of how likely a project’s claims regarding price, timing, and performance will hold
6. Siting flexibility: a measure of how constrained a resource is to a specific geography

This frame is ultimately something the buyer should score themselves; below you will find our current read. Red (unfavorable) represents a weakness that can end an evaluation on its own, green (favorable) means the dimension won’t constrain the decision, and yellow (moderate) sits somewhere in between. 

Comparing the clean firm power options is, perhaps ironically, challenging along the “clean” and “firm” lines. Every serious contender delivers low-carbon power around the clock, because that is the price of admission. Not one technology earns an unfavorable rating in those categories. And that is the catch: every weakness in the comparison table sits somewhere else. The dimensions that ultimately win (or end) these contracts may be the ones that the “clean firm” label can obscure or oversimplify.

A resource that cannot be energized for a decade, or sited near load, or delivered at a price a buyer cannot defend internally, may be infeasible regardless of what else it offers. None of the four clean firm generation technology groupings clear every hurdle today, but they can satisfy different buyer priorities.  

Solar or wind with LDES offers more buyer flexibility, at a price. Enough generation, storage, and other firming can deliver the reliability required, and the buyer sets that target. But the increments get expensive quickly, especially when reliability gaps remain long or unpredictable. Covering more hours means more storage and more generation to fill it, so each step toward firmness parity costs more than the one before it. Firming shortfalls also carry carbon consequences, depending on what gets called to compensate. Those emissions may be absent from GHG accounting ledgers, but that doesn’t stop them from hitting the atmosphere. 

Gas with CCS is challenged by execution and siting because the product depends on a chain: gas generation, capture, transport, and a permitted storage site capable of permanent CO₂ disposal at scale. Each piece can be developed and tested, but low-carbon electricity requires all of them to work together, which can only be demonstrated once all are built. A buyer cannot substitute a link, and cannot observe the whole chain before committing. Clean, in this sense, is conditional, and the delivered power could end up being far more carbon-intensive than advertised.

Nuclear ranks poorly on time, cost, and execution, but full-scale reactors and small modular reactors carry those weaknesses differently. A large reactor arrives in one piece, and its schedule and final cost come into focus as construction advances. By then, years and billions are committed; a buyer cannot learn from a fraction of a reactor before deciding whether to finish it. Small modular reactors are designed to break that capacity into increments a buyer could add as demand grows, which would ease the one-piece problem. But none are operating commercially in the US yet, and the signed deals target first power in the 2030s, so the modular promise is still years out. 

Geothermal’s weaknesses work somewhat differently. Conventional hydrothermal is tightly constrained by location, which buyers can screen before choosing where to procure, or co-locate where possible. Next-generation geothermal, including EGS, could widen that geography considerably. 

For EGS, the largest remaining uncertainty is execution: whether the developers can replicate successful drilling and reservoir performance at commercial scale. Part of that risk belongs to the rock, and no contract can make a reservoir perform. But drilling also produces information before the entire project has been built, and geothermal capacity can often be developed incrementally as needed. A buyer can require resource evidence before committing, tie later commitments to demonstrated performance, or spread procurement across projects rather than depend on a single field. 

Geothermal’s flexibility has limits. A buyer who needs full capacity by a fixed date may have little room to wait for wells to perform before committing to the next phase. And successful wells do not eliminate risk in project expansion or guarantee performance in other locations. Execution risk stays with the resource. What geothermal offers is more opportunity to learn about that risk while a buyer can still do something about it. 

Revisiting the Geothermal Premium

Geothermal contracts, especially EGS, remain expensive. But that premium looks different on this side of the comparison. Clean has a cost, but so does firmness, speed,  reach, and execution. Every clean firm option pays for those attributes somewhere. Solar and wind contracts will remain cheap by comparison, but it’s the wrong comparison: the market signing geothermal contracts is pricing a much larger product. 

That still leaves a hard decision. Geothermal and gas with CCS carry execution risk and siting constraints. Nuclear asks more of the buyer on cost and time. Firmed solar asks more as reliability requirements rise. The best option will change with each buyer, location, and project. Geothermal’s place in that choice is changing quickly. EGS is expanding where projects can be developed, drilling costs are falling, and commercial experience is growing. Those advances are bringing geothermal into consideration for buyers who previously had little reason to look its way. 

And that may be the more revealing aspect of the geothermal market today: buyers are signing those contracts with the alternatives in full view. Their decisions offer an early indication of what clean firm power delivered in the right place and at the right time is worth, and which risks buyers are willing to carry to get it. 

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Geothermal Cheaper Than a Solar PPA? 

No, a geothermal power contract can be significantly more expensive than a solar PPA. But they're not the same product: solar meets annual clean-energy targets, while geothermal delivers firm, dispatchable power around the clock, which is why buyers are increasingly comparing it to nuclear and gas with CCS instead.

Is Geothermal Cheaper Than Solar with LDES? 

Not necessarily on a per-contract basis, but the cost structures behave differently. Solar with LDES gets more expensive with every additional hour of reliability a buyer needs, since covering more hours means adding both more storage and more generation to fill it. Geothermal's premium, by contrast, is priced into the contract upfront as a firm, dispatchable product from day one.

How Does Geothermal's Risk Compare to Gas with CCS? 

Differently, in a way that matters to buyers. Gas with CCS depends on a chain (generation, capture, transport, and storage) that can only be verified once the whole system is built, so a buyer can't test it piece by piece. Geothermal generates performance data incrementally through drilling, letting buyers require resource evidence or tie commitments to demonstrated results before committing further, though this data does not come free.

Which Deploys Faster, Geothermal or Nuclear? 

Geothermal, in regions with already-proven resources. Fervo's Cape Station, for example, broke ground in 2023 and is on track for first power in late 2026 and 500 MW by 2028: a fraction of a typical new-nuclear large reactor timeline.

Key Takeaways

• The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and life cycle assessment (LCA) offer distinct frameworks for measuring electricity-related emissions, one for annual corporate reporting and one for detailed cradle-to-grave analysis, leading to different emissions results.
• Renewable energy certificates (RECs) are accepted under the GHG Protocol's market-based approach to reduce reported scope 2 and scope 3: category 3 emissions, but are not explicitly addressed in ISO LCA standards, where transparent disclosure is essential.
• Using both the GHG Protocol and LCA together, while recognizing their different scopes, boundaries, and purposes, can give organizations a more complete and strategic view of electricity-related emissions and decarbonization opportunities.

Electricity-Related Emissions: Why Measurement Methods Matter

In the era of AI-driven power demand, scrutiny over electricity-related emissions is intensifying. With this increased attention comes growing confusion around how to measure and report these emissions. The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and life cycle assessment (LCA) are two widely used methods for measuring and reporting electricity-related emissions, but each follows its own complex and often incompatible, set of rules.

This piece will examine the differences between these approaches and answer common questions such as:

• What are the differences between the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and LCA?
• Why do they result in different emissions for the same type and amount of electricity?
• Can renewable energy contracts reduce electricity-related emissions under both methods?
• When should you use each approach?

Both the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and LCA are powerful tools that, if used in complementary ways, can help organizations identify emissions hotspots and develop more effective pathways for decarbonization.

What Is the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard?

The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard is a globally recognized framework for corporate entities to publicly report GHG emissions throughout their value chain. It divides emissions into three scopes:

• Scope 1: Direct emissions from owned or controlled sources, such as company-owned vehicles, on-site fuel consumption, or industrial processes.,
• Scope 2: Indirect emissions from the generation of purchased electricity, heat, steam, or cooling. These emissions are generated off-site, but result from an organization's energy consumption.
• Scope 3: Indirect emissions across an organization's value chain. Scope 3 is divided into 15 categories, including a company's supply chain activities, business travel, employee commuting, investments, and product life cycle emissions.

This piece focuses on emissions associated with electricity consumed by a reporting entity. These electricity-related emissions primarily fall under scope 2 and scope 3: category 3 (fuel- and energy-related activities, or FERA).

Scope 2: Electricity Generation Emissions

Scope 2 emissions account for the generation of electricity a company purchases or uses. Hypothetically, if a company were powered by a single solar project, it would report zero scope 2 emissions. In reality, a company is powered by a combination of power generation assets and must report them under scope 2 emissions. These emissions can be reported using two methods:

• Location-based method: Reflects the average emissions intensity of the local electricity grid where the consumption occurs. This approach is mandatory under various reporting frameworks and does not take into account a company's procurement choices.
• Market-based method: Reflects an organization's actual procurement decisions and energy-sourcing strategies. It accounts for specific contracts, such as power purchase agreements (PPAs), renewable energy certificates (RECs), and green tariffs, which allow businesses to claim lower emissions from their purchased electricity.

Scope 3: Category 3 FERA

Scope 3: category 3 FERA reports on non-generation electricity emissions associated with:

• Upstream emissions: Emissions associated with the production and transportation of fuels needed for electricity generation
• Transmission and distribution losses: Emissions associated with the loss of electricity while delivering it from the generator to the consumer.

The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard does not include emissions associated with the manufacturing, construction, and end-of-life phases of electricity generation equipment; however, some datasets used for reporting may include manufacturing emissions. While scope 3: category 3 guidance may not require these emissions to be included, if possible, companies reporting on their electricity-related emissions should include these additional sources of emissions  in order to more completely represent their total emissions impact. The GHG Protocol Scope 2 Guidance allows for the reduction of some of the reported scope 3 FERA emissions by contracting renewable energy (see Appendix B).

What is an LCA?

An LCA is a systematic method used to quantify the environmental impacts of a process, product, or project throughout its full life cycle. A life cycle includes everything from raw material extraction ("cradle") to manufacturing/production ("gate") through disposal ("grave").

LCAs primarily follow a standard published by the ISO organization (ISO 14040/14044). The ISO standards establish industry-wide rules for which processes are included and how to assign environmental burdens to products.

An LCA can be used for any product, process, or project, and can estimate multiple different environmental impacts (i.e., climate change, human health, ecotoxicity, eutrophication, ozone depletion).

Electricity-Related Emissions Can Be Different Using the GHG Protocol and an LCA

The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and an LCA (as per ISO standards) generally include different life cycle stages of electricity use when estimating GHG emissions. Therefore, the approaches can result in different reported emissions.

Key Differences in Reporting Electricity-Related Emissions

The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard includes emissions in the following phases:

• Generation (scope 2)
• Transmission and distribution losses (scope 3: category 3)
• Fuel, if applicable (scope 3: category 3)

A “cradle-to-grave” LCA considers emissions from all activities associated with power generation, including:

• Manufacturing
• Construction
• Generation
• Fuel, if applicable
• Use-phase, if applicable
• End-of-life

Use-phase electricity-related emissions are emissions generated by electricity-consuming equipment used or sold by the reporting company (representing additional scope 1 or scope 3 emissions, respectively). Examples include sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) emissions from electrical transformers or refrigerant leakage from air conditioners with high global warming potential. Please note that both the ISO and GHG Protocol Corporate Standard provide guidelines for reporting these emissions. However, due to the equipment-specific nature of these emissions, they are excluded from the following table. The table compares electricity-related emissions associated with different electricity sources using the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard approach and the LCA approach.

Reporting Electricity-Related Emissions

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* US average transportation and distribution loss rate (4.2%) times US average grid carbon intensity (410 gCO₂e/kWh). Note: gCO₂e/kWh = grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt-hour. Source: GREET 2024 (US grid average. 10% fuel- and energy-related activities; 1% construction, facilities, maintenance, and end-of-life; 89% fuel combustion).

Reducing Electricity Emissions with Renewable Energy

Renewable Energy Mechanisms Under the GHG Protocol

The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard allows companies to contract for renewable electricity as a mechanism to reduce reported emissions. The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard defines allowable energy contracts that can be used to reduce emissions associated with electricity consumption (market-based reporting).

In North America, one of these allowable contracts is RECs, each of which represent one megawatt-hour of renewable generation. Analogous instruments used in other locations, such as Guarantees of Origin in Europe and green electricity certificates in China, are also permissible under the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard.

RECs were developed as a contractual mechanism for renewable electricity in response to the fundamental structure of "a power grid." In a power grid, it is impossible to link a single generator to a single load. Power is injected at a point in the grid and withdrawn at a different point in the grid; there is no traceable pathway.

RECs were created to track the attributes of electricity generation entering into a power grid for the entity that consumes the power at a different point. The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard allows buyers to claim exclusive use of renewable electricity with RECs even if they are actually consuming a mixture of electricity from the grid.

Renewable Energy Mechanisms Under the LCA ISO Standard

The ISO 14040 standard does not address the use of renewable electricity contracts. However, the ISO 14044 standard provides the following guidance:

"When determining the elementary flows associated with production, the actual production mix should be used whenever possible, in order to reflect the various types of resources that are consumed. As an example, for the production and delivery of electricity, account shall be taken of the electricity mix, the efficiencies of fuel combustion, conversion, transmission and distribution losses."

It does not explicitly define whether RECs can or cannot be used in the determination of the "actual production mix." In the event an organization does procure a renewable energy contract to reduce the emissions reported within the LCA, it should disclose that clearly in order to communicate the impact of the contract on the carbon intensity of the LCA with and without the use of RECs.

Powerful Tools for Different Use Cases

The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and LCAs following the ISO Standard are both powerful tools that can provide insight into emissions associated with electricity use. The GHG Protocol Corporate Standard allows companies to use a standardized framework to report emissions associated with electricity use and interventions on an annual basis. The LCA ISO standard is a detail-driven analysis that allows a deep dive into specific processes, projects, or products. This detailed analysis allows for deeper insights into areas where a company may have more ability to address specific interventions for emission hot spots. Using these tools together, while understanding the boundaries of each, can provide companies with a more effective and impactful approach to decarbonization.

Frequently Asked Questions

What are the differences between the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard and LCA? 

The GHG Protocol is an annual corporate reporting framework covering scope 2 (generation) and scope 3: category 3 (transmission and distribution losses, fuel), while a cradle-to-grave LCA is a detailed analysis governed by ISO 14040/14044 standards that also includes manufacturing, construction, use-phase, and end-of-life emissions. LCA can also be applied to any product or process and multiple environmental impacts, not just greenhouse gas emissions.

Why do they result in different emissions for the same type and amount of electricity? 

They include different life cycle stages. The GHG Protocol excludes manufacturing, construction, and end-of-life emissions of generation equipment, while an LCA includes them.

Can renewable energy contracts reduce reported electricity-related emissions under both methods? 

Under the GHG Protocol, renewable energy contracts (e.g., RECs, PPAs) are explicitly allowed to report zero market-based scope 2 emissions, though scope 3 FERA emissions remain. Under ISO LCA standards, these contracts aren't explicitly addressed. Organizations may choose to apply them, but should transparently disclose LCA results both with and without the contract's impact.

When should you use the GHG Protocol vs an LCA? 

Use the GHG Protocol for standardized, annual corporate-wide emissions reporting and tracking procurement interventions; use an LCA for a detailed, process- or product-specific deep dive to identify specific emissions hotspots. Relae recommends using both together for a more complete, strategic view of electricity-related emissions.

Key Takeaways

• Accelerated phase-out schedules for key clean energy and decarbonization tax credits will shorten the runway for project development, which could stall or cancel projects.
• Urgency is paramount, and qualified projects should expedite construction and operational timelines to secure eligibility for existing credits.
• A more complicated policy landscape requires concerted effort to navigate, including with the support of policy professionals.

Reconciliation Rolls Back Much of the IRA

On Friday, July 4, 2025, the President signed a sweeping reconciliation bill, H.R. 1, that will add at least $3.3 trillion to the national debt and marks a pivotal, contentious moment for US clean energy policy. The law was enacted through the complex legislative process known as budget reconciliation, requiring only a simple majority of votes in the House and Senate. The new law substantially modifies or terminates many of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA)'s clean energy incentives and has extensive implications for the economic viability of American energy and manufacturing projects.  

In the Senate, three Republicans crossed party lines to vote against the bill, requiring Vice President JD Vance to break the tie. In the House, only two Republicans broke ranks to vote against final passage. While some of the more complex provisions of the bill, such as new foreign entity of concern (FEOC) restrictions, will require more time to fully assess, we've prepared a rapid run-down of key alterations to IRA incentives for carbon management, hydrogen, and clean fuel technologies.

What Is the 2025 Reconciliation Bill?

While the 2025 reconciliation bill is staggering in length, scope, and severity, containing provisions to cut Medicaid, reduce nutrition assistance, raise the debt limit, and cut taxes primarily for the wealthy, some of the most drastic sections of the bill modify tax incentives and other public funding for clean energy and emissions reductions.

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Many of the incentives to deploy clean energy that were created or enhanced under the IRA will be phased out early or repealed altogether. Credits with accelerated phase-out schedules include the newly created 45Y clean electricity production tax credit, which will no longer support wind or solar projects after 2027, and the 45V credit for clean hydrogen production for which projects must now commence construction before Jan 1, 2028 (moved up from Jan 1, 2033). 

Since the passage of the reconciliation package, there has been active litigation on several provisions, including an order from a federal district court to vacate IRS guidance that would have prohibited certain wind and solar projects from securing safe harbor.  The table below provides a detailed breakdown of key changes to major tax credits between the original IRA, the draft that moved through Committees in the House, and the final text that was passed by the Senate and signed into law.

Major Tax Credit Changes in the Reconciliation Law

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How FEOC Restrictions Threaten Clean Energy Supply Chains

Many clean energy tax credits include ambiguous language restricting projects connected to FEOC, complicating supply chains and creating new problems for developers of clean energy projects. The law also introduces a complex matrix of new definitions, such as "Prohibited Foreign Entities," which includes both "Specified Foreign Entities" and "Foreign-Influenced Entities."

The FEOC restrictions embedded in the reconciliation bill represent a seismic shift for clean energy developers. These new rules, designed to limit the influence of Covered Nations (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran), will disqualify projects from receiving tax credits if they source components, minerals, or intellectual property from entities tied to these nations. In other instances, the partial ownership or investment of an entity with financial ties to a Prohibited Foreign Entity may also disqualify a project from qualifying for tax credits.

This FEOC language matters for developers and investors because of the resulting global supply chain disruptions, investment uncertainty, and compliance burdens. The clean energy sector is deeply reliant on global supply chains, especially for solar panels, batteries, and wind components, industries where China currently dominates. The IRA intended to counter this by moving the manufacturing and production of these supply chains to the US. Project developers must now thoroughly review their supply chains and capital providers, and may need to quickly pivot to compliant resources. 

In February 2026, the IRS released interim guidance on the FEOC provisions to provide safe harbor guidance for clean energy manufacturing, investment, and production credits to help taxpayers gauge whether material assistance was provided by a prohibited foreign entity. 

Other Major Rollbacks to the IRA

Beyond clean energy tax credits, the reconciliation package also repeals and rescinds many other IRA provisions. This includes a full rescission of all unobligated IRA appropriated balances at the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office, and several other programs, including:

• The Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program
• Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund
• Transmission Facility Financing

A complete list of rescissions of energy-related funding is outlined in Sections 60001-60024 and 50402 of the law. These rescissions represent tens of billions of dollars in lost climate investments made under the IRA, which would have provided funds to state, local, and Tribal governments, federal agencies, non-profits, and commercial project developers to reduce emissions and update critical infrastructure.

What Can Project Developers and Other Companies Do?

Developers will need to act quickly to meet updated commence construction and place into service requirements, though circumstances are technology specific (e.g., safe harbor updates to 48E and 45Y). Tax credits generally have advanced commence construction and operational deadlines, resulting in a strong first-movers advantage. Companies should also review their supply chains and revise equipment and material procurement sourcing plans as necessary to address restrictions presented in the reconciliation bill.

An executive order from President Donald Trump issued on July 7 will further complicate how companies proceed. In the EO, the President directs his administration to "strictly enforce the termination of […] 45Y and 48E […] for wind and solar facilities." The Administration will likely issue extremely strict interpretations of "commence construction" clauses and FEOC requirements in forthcoming tax credit guidance issued by the Treasury Department, though these moves are quite likely to face litigation.

The new restrictions being proposed by the Administration, including specific details on FEOC, qualified equipment, commence construction, and other reporting requirements, will require additional guidance from the IRS and provide an opportunity for engagement through public comment. It is important that impacted companies weigh in during these public comment periods, not only to help inform and influence the final rules issued by the Administration, but also to build an administrative record that could support litigation efforts to strike down the final rules.

Staying Ahead of Policy Changes

Given the rapidly shifting landscape of energy policy, it's paramount that companies stay abreast of the latest changes and dedicate resources to understanding how they may be affected. Policy professionals, including the experts at Relae (formerly Carbon Direct), can support organizations as they engage in the regulatory process, anticipate and prepare for new legislation, and navigate the requirements to access essential tax credits and incentives. Even under new constraints, expert guidance can help maximize impact and minimize disruption.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does the reconciliation bill change the timelines for major clean energy tax credits?
Most clean energy tax credits saw their windows shortened relative to the original IRA: 

• The 45Y and 48E credits now terminate entirely for wind and solar facilities placed in service after December 31, 2027, with a separate phase-down (75% in 2034, 50% in 2035, 0% after) for other technologies. 
• The 45V clean hydrogen credit's "commence construction" deadline moved from December 31, 2032 to December 31, 2027. 
• The 45Z clean fuel credit now ends on December 31, 2029 (versus 2027 in the original IRA, but bonuses for SAF have been removed and new emissions-calculation methods favor corn ethanol). 
• Notably, the 45Q carbon capture credit saw little change and retained transferability, with credit values for enhanced oil recovery and utilization raised to match secure geological storage.

What are the FEOC restrictions, and why do they matter so much for developers?
FEOC ("Foreign Entity of Concern") restrictions disqualify projects from tax credits if they source components, minerals, or intellectual property from entities tied to China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. Even partial ownership or investment ties to a "Prohibited Foreign Entity" can trigger disqualification. The definitions are complex and still being clarified through IRS guidance, meaning developers need to review supply chains and capital providers carefully and may need to pivot to compliant sourcing.

What should project developers do now in response to these changes?
Developers should move quickly to meet the earlier "commence construction" and "placed in service" deadlines, since credits now benefit early actors. This includes reviewing and potentially restructuring supply chains and procurement plans to address FEOC restrictions, and closely monitoring forthcoming IRS/Treasury guidance. 

Key Takeaways

• Speed to operation is the value proposition. While grid interconnection can take 3-5 years in constrained regions, hydrogen fuel cell systems can be deployed in a fraction of that time—a large advantage for operators racing to meet data center capacity demands.
• Hydrogen is moving beyond backup. Fuel cells could supply 6-15% of incremental data center power, functioning as primary or near-primary power rather than emergency standby.
• Higher fuel costs can be rational. When the alternative is a multi-year wait for grid power and the development loss that comes with it, paying a premium for hydrogen is better than falling behind.

The Grid Can’t Keep Up With Data Centers

The data center infrastructure buildout is moving at a pace the US power grid was never designed to accommodate. Cleanview tracks about 63 GW of operating US data center capacity and another 392 GW in planning, roughly six times what exists today. Developers in high-demand corridors—Northern Virginia, Central Texas, Phoenix—are finding that the grid can't deliver new capacity fast enough.

Interconnection queues now stretch 3-5 years in many regions, and that’s before accounting for permitting, transmission upgrades, and substation buildouts. For operators that need power online faster than the grid can deliver it, this timeline gap is a fundamental constraint on the business.

This mismatch between AI deployment, generator bottlenecks, and grid timelines is why hydrogen is entering the conversation as a viable power option for a growing subset of data center deployments, alongside natural gas with carbon capture, geothermal, and long-duration energy storage.

Hydrogen Fuel Cells: From Standby to Primary Power

For most of its history in data centers, hydrogen has been discussed as a cleaner replacement for diesel backup generators. That framing undersells the opportunity. 

The shift happening now is more fundamental: hydrogen fuel cells are being evaluated as primary or near-primary power sources for behind-the-meter and facilities that can’t wait for grid connection. Notably, many modern fuel cell systems—including solid oxide fuel cells—can run on natural gas today and transition to hydrogen as clean supply becomes available. Bloom Energy's 2024 deal with American Electric Power to provide up to 1 GW of fuel cells for data center power illustrates this approach: the systems will initially run on natural gas, with the capability to switch to 100% hydrogen in the future.

Furthermore, fuel cell systems are modular, can be deployed incrementally as load grows, and provide continuous power output. This is a promising path, and one that will scale only as fast as the fuel cell supply chain can keep up. Unlike solar or wind, fuel cells aren’t weather-dependent. Running on hydrogen, they produce zero direct emissions at the point of use. Running on natural gas, they still emit CO₂, but their higher efficiency gives them a lower carbon intensity than a comparable gas turbine.

Goldman Sachs estimates that fuel cells could supply 6-15% of incremental data center power (the estimate doesn't specify fuel mix, though most near-term deployments would run primarily on natural gas). This is a meaningful share of new capacity, driven largely by operators who face years-long waits for both grid connections and new gas turbines. Bloom Energy, whose fuel cell products serve data center applications, has been a notable outlier in an otherwise struggling hydrogen sector, with its stock rising sharply on strong revenue performance and growing investor enthusiasm around data center power demand.

Speed to power depends on the fuel. Solid oxide fuel cells run on pipeline natural gas today, so operators do not wait for a hydrogen supply chain. Bloom states it can deliver onsite power for an entire data center in as little as 90 days, with the ability to add modules as load grows under certain circumstances. In all but a few select locations, hydrogen comes later when the same systems switch fuels as clean supply scales. Projects that need hydrogen from day one face additional challenges. Limited hydrogen availability and supporting infrastructure across much of the US can undermine the potential speed advantage of hydrogen-dependent projects. Nevertheless, locations with suitable hydrogen supply and supporting infrastructure may offer viable near-term opportunities.

The Hydrogen Premium: When Paying More Makes Sense

Hydrogen-generated power is more expensive than other forms of electricity generation in most markets. The logistics penalty (including compression, transport, and storage) can push hydrogen from $4/kg at the production site to $8-16/kg delivered, making the economics look unfavorable on a simple $/MWh comparison. In practical terms, hydrogen at $4-6/kg translates to roughly $120-180/MWh on an energy-content basis (LHV). At a fuel cell electrical efficiency of around 50%—typical for solid oxide systems—the effective cost of electricity rises to approximately $240-360/MWh for co-located production, compared to $40-60/MWh for natural gas fuel cells, $51-129/MWh for gas combined cycle, and $144-276/MWh for gas peakers. Operators can improve hydrogen economics by co-locating with production, avoiding the logistics penalty that can double or quadruple delivered costs.

While expensive, this cost comparison misses the central point. The relevant question is not whether hydrogen is cheaper than grid power, but whether it is better than having no access to power at all.

For an operator with signed contracts and a 100 MW facility sitting idle during a multi-year interconnection queue, the opportunity cost is substantial. At average US wholesale colocation rates (~$196/kW/month - a record high), a facility of that size represents roughly $235 million per year in potential revenue—meaning even a single year of delay can outweigh years of hydrogen fuel premiums. 

The Inflation Reduction Act’s 45V Production Tax Credit further compresses the gap, offering up to $3/kg for clean hydrogen production—but projects must begin construction by December 31, 2027, to qualify. That deadline adds urgency to what’s already a time-sensitive calculus.

Reframing the Cost Debate for Speed-to-Power

The debate about whether hydrogen is cost-competitive with grid power misses the strategic challenge facing data center operators today: the fastest path to reliable, clean power. Hydrogen can play a consequential role in that timeline in some markets.

Assessing that requires modeling the full picture: grid interconnection timelines, hydrogen supply chain costs at a specific location, the 45V credit’s impact on project economics, and how hydrogen compares to batteries and other bridging technologies for a data center’s particular load profile.

Relae’s advisory team helps data center operators and technology companies evaluate these tradeoffs with rigorous, independent analysis. If speed to operation is a factor in your energy planning, let’s talk.

Frequently Asked Questions

How much faster is hydrogen fuel cell deployment than waiting for grid interconnection?
Grid interconnection in constrained regions can take 3-5 years once permitting, transmission upgrades, and substation buildouts are factored in. Fuel cell systems, especially those that start on natural gas and then transition to hydrogen, can be deployed in a fraction of that time. They are modular and can be installed and scaled incrementally as a facility’s load grows, though the pace depends on equipment and fuel supply.

If hydrogen costs more than grid power, why would an operator choose it?
For an operator with a 100 MW facility sitting idle during a multi-year interconnection queue, the lost revenue—roughly $235 million a year at average US wholesale colocation rates—can outweigh years of hydrogen’s fuel premium. That makes the higher cost a rational tradeoff against a multi-year wait for grid power, not just an expensive alternative to it.

Do hydrogen fuel cell systems have to run on pure hydrogen from day one?
No. Many modern fuel cell systems, including solid oxide fuel cells, can run on natural gas today and transition to hydrogen as clean supply becomes available. Bloom Energy’s up to 1 GW agreement with American Electric Power follows this model: the systems start on natural gas, with the capability to switch to 100% hydrogen as the hydrogen supply chain matures.

Key Takeaways 

• AI data centers are driving the fastest electricity demand growth in decades: US data centers consume an estimated 4 to 5% of US electricity today, projected to reach as much as 9 to 17% by 2030 (EPRI).
• Without deliberate cost allocation, residential and small-business ratepayers subsidize private AI infrastructure. 
• Peer-reviewed modeling projects data center growth could raise US power costs 6 to 29% nationally by 2030, and up to 57% in the hardest-hit regions.
• Utility commissioners, state regulators, and policymakers now have working models to draw from, including large-load tariffs, dedicated rate classes, and direct assignment of transmission costs.

AI Data Center Energy Demand Is Testing the Limits of the Grid

AI is driving electricity demand at a pace the US grid has not seen in decades. US data centers already consume an estimated 4 to 5% of the nation's electricity, and EPRI projects that share could reach 9 to 17% by 2030. Behind nearly every AI model and digital product is the invisible infrastructure that powers it: data centers. These facilities are resource-intensive, requiring massive amounts of electricity to power servers, substantial water for cooling, and extensive new grid infrastructure.

In the race to decarbonize the grid, data centers are emerging as a critical pressure point. This infrastructure sits at the intersection of digital growth and climate action, forcing a difficult question: who pays to power AI?

Legacy Utility Models Weren’t Built for this Growth

Utilities must upgrade aging grid infrastructure to meet this new surge in electricity demand, while maintaining reliability. Under legacy utility frameworks, it's often ratepayers who foot the bill for those upgrades. And the costs are not distributed equitably.

Traditional utility planning assumes that increased demand justifies expanded investment in generation and transmission infrastructure. When a new type of large customer, like a tech company, moves into a utility’s service territory, utilities plan new infrastructure to meet that projected demand. 

Utilities typically recover the cost of new infrastructure through a process called rate base cost recovery. This allows utilities to charge all customers in the “rate base” for the expenses incurred, including thousands of individuals, families, and small businesses, even when those costs stem from the demands of just a few large users.   

This legacy model struggles to keep pace in the AI boom era, where massive new electricity demand can double within a few years, a scale of growth that used to take decades. Additionally, while data centers create short-term construction jobs, there are almost no lasting employment benefits for local communities.

It's clearly inequitable for all ratepayers to bear the costs of upgrading the grid to benefit just a small number of massive data centers. But that's not the only problem. If utilities decide to meet new power demand from large data centers with new fossil fuel generation, such as gas peaker plants, they risk creating stranded assets: infrastructure that becomes obsolete or uneconomical as climate targets, clean energy mandates, or the cost-effectiveness of renewables accelerates. Once built, ratepayers will have to continue paying for these long-lived investments for years, even if they are underutilized or retired early due to policy shifts. This risk is no longer hypothetical: to serve projected data center load, Georgia regulators approved a plan to extend the lives of two massive coal plants to as late as 2038, and Virginia regulators stripped roughly $350 million tied to speculative early-stage data center projects out of Dominion Energy's revenue forecast.

If utilities are locking in decades of new fossil fuel generation to meet short-term data center growth, ratepayers may be left holding the bag for infrastructure that contradicts their climate goals and state mandates, with little ratepayer or community input into the decision. Effectively, local communities may be subsidizing a technology that they did not directly ask for in the first place and has little to no direct community benefits. The result is a long-term misalignment between utility investment strategy and the public interest.

Ratepayers Bear the Cost of Private AI Expansion

The economic burden of data center expansion can fall disproportionately on households and small businesses. But data centers, as the largest and fastest-growing users, often negotiate bespoke contracts, subsidized rates, or fixed-price electricity agreements that shield them from long-term cost volatility.

This can result in other customers, especially residential and low-income ratepayers, bearing a disproportionate share of the infrastructure and maintenance costs. In many states, residential and low-income customers already experience energy cost burdens that exceed affordability thresholds. Adding the weight of infrastructure investments to serve energy-intensive data centers, without sharing those costs equitably, exacerbates an already regressive utility cost allocation system.

Georgia shows how these costs reach ratepayers even when regulators act. Georgia Power customers absorbed six rate increases totaling roughly $43 per month between 2023 and 2025, and while regulators approved a base-rate freeze through 2028, the freeze excluded fuel and storm costs. In 2026 fuel-cost proceedings, testimony showed that large industrial and data center customers raise other customers' monthly fuel costs by 5 to 11%, prompting the Georgia Public Service Commission to open an investigation into how fuel costs are allocated between large loads and residential customers. Ratepayers noticed: in November 2025, both Georgia PSC seats flipped in elections run explicitly on utility bills and data center cost-shifting. In Virginia, regulators approved a rate increase of roughly $16 per month for typical Dominion Energy residential customers amid surging data center demand.

These examples are not anomalies. A peer-reviewed study in Environmental Research Letters projects that data center growth could raise US power costs 6 to 29% nationally by 2030, and up to 57% in the hardest-hit regions, with Virginia among the steepest. This is a systemic shift in energy demand, one that places a growing burden on communities and lacks clear public benefits.

Environmental and Community Impacts Are Mounting

Beyond economic impacts, the geography of data center development reveals another layer of inequity: environmental justice. Data center siting often prioritizes affordable land, low resource costs (e.g., electricity, water), and climate considerations like heat variability. They also rely on proximity to pre-existing fossil fuel generation and transmission infrastructure. Research now confirms the pattern this creates: an analysis of 550 EPA-regulated data centers found that air pollution burdens near data centers rise with the share of people of color living nearby, and a 2026 Washington state study found more than half the state's data centers sit in census tracts with the highest concentrations of people of color.

These communities often absorb the negative externalities beyond their electricity bills, including increased air pollution from peaker plants and on-site diesel or gas backup generators, traffic and construction noise, water stress, and land use changes. Simultaneously, they do not receive direct net positive benefits. Frontline communities are paying attention to this trend, and opposition has become a defining force in where AI infrastructure gets built. Gallup finds 71% of Americans now oppose a data center in their own area, and Data Center Watch counted roughly $130 billion in projects blocked or delayed in the first quarter of 2026 alone. The stakes of community opposition are increasing and intensifying. 

The consequences of ignoring communities are now playing out in federal court. At xAI's Colossus facility in Memphis, developers operated dozens of on-site gas turbines without air permits in a majority-Black area already burdened by industrial pollution. After the Shelby County Health Department granted permits for a subset of turbines in July 2025, the fight moved to xAI's second campus across the state line: in April 2026, the NAACP filed a Clean Air Act lawsuit over roughly 27 unpermitted gas turbines at the Colossus 2 site in Southaven, Mississippi, seeking penalties of more than $100,000 per day. On-site power can help reduce demand on the grid, which can be a benefit. But when that generation runs without permits or oversight, nearby communities bear unmeasured health and environmental impacts from hazardous emissions, and the litigation now underway shows how quickly unpermitted power becomes a legal and reputational liability.

To date, data center developers do not appear to have maximized potential community benefits or engagement. Data centers have not typically employed many local residents beyond construction phases, resulting in limited economic benefits, particularly when facility ownership is distant from the local community or has few local ties. When these same communities already experience high pollution burden or economic precarity, the cumulative impact of a new data center can deepen existing vulnerabilities.

Water use is also a mounting environmental justice concern. Many data centers rely on evaporative cooling systems that draw millions of gallons of water per day, and peer-reviewed research finds significant gaps in how the industry discloses its water footprint. In drought-prone regions, this can stress already-depleted aquifers and heighten tensions over water access.

The result is a high-stakes tradeoff between digital infrastructure and local resource resilience, one that communities should be a part of deciding.

States and Regulators Are Writing the New Rules 

Virginia, the "Data Center Capital of the World," is home to 674 data centers that consume an estimated 25% of the state's electricity, a share EPRI projects could reach 39 to 57% by 2030, the highest of any state. After legislators considered but did not pass data center bills in the 2025 session, the 2026 General Assembly passed roughly 15 data center bills, including legislation, signed in May 2026, directing regulators to ensure data center costs are not subsidized by other customers, along with new requirements for site impact assessments and water-use reporting. Virginia's State Corporation Commission had already created a dedicated rate class for high energy use customers, with 14-year contract terms and minimum charges that apply whether or not the projected load materializes, and in August 2026 it went further, ordering Dominion to develop a tariff that directly assigns transmission costs to the data centers that trigger them.

Virginia is not alone. Ohio regulators approved a landmark tariff requiring large data centers to pay for 85% of the capacity they request, whether or not they use it. Oregon's POWER Act created the nation's first legislated rate class for data centers. Texas gave its grid operator authority to curtail large loads during emergencies. Minnesota, California, Alabama, Tennessee, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Florida have all enacted their own ratepayer-protection measures, and at the federal level, FERC ordered the nation's largest grid operator to write new rules for data centers that co-locate with power plants, citing the need for consumer protection and clear cost allocation. State energy officials are also proactively planning for data center expansion.

The direction is clear. The unresolved question is whether these reforms move faster than the costs already flowing to ratepayers.

What Is the Public Good of Data Centers?

AI infrastructure powers innovation, job creation, research, and the technologies we rely on every day. But it may also bring inequitable social and direct financial costs. Like highways, factories, and pipelines before them, the question remains: What is the public good of AI data centers? How should we hold data center developers accountable to the public interest, which values a clean energy future? We need clear-eyed assessments of how data centers impact energy affordability, climate progress, and environmental equity.

Yesterday's utility policy frameworks were not designed for hyperscale AI data centers. The reforms now underway are a start, but without sustained attention they may still force the public to subsidize private expansion, through economic and environmental costs, often without equitable community engagement, climate accountability, or local benefit.

AI Data Center Growth Needs Accountability, Equity, and Reform

To align data center growth with the public interest, the stakeholders involved now have proven models to build on:

• Utilities and regulators can require large customers to pay an equitable share of new infrastructure costs, as Ohio's minimum-take tariff and Virginia's dedicated rate class now do.
• Public Utility Commissions can mandate equity and community impact assessments during siting and permitting, following Virginia's new site assessment requirements.
• States can condition tax incentives and zoning approvals on local hiring, emissions reductions, and community benefits agreements.
• Data center developers can prioritize clean power and commit to transparent, equitable community engagement and benefits plans before opposition, litigation, and cancellations decide the outcome for them.

As we build the digital backbone of the next century, we must avoid repeating injustices of the past. A just energy transition requires more than megawatts: it demands equity, policy interventions, and real climate progress.

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Frequently Asked Questions

How do utilities typically recover the cost of infrastructure built to serve large data center customers, and why does this burden fall on other ratepayers?

Utilities recover infrastructure investments through rate base cost recovery: regulators approve new generation, transmission, and distribution spending, and the costs are spread across all customers in the rate base through their monthly bills. That model worked when demand growth was gradual and diffuse, but when a single data center campus drives hundreds of megawatts of new investment, standard cost allocation spreads those costs across households and small businesses unless regulators adopt a special tariff or rate class that assigns them to the customer who caused them.

What are stranded assets in the context of data center power demand, and how do they create long-term risk for utilities and ratepayers?

Stranded assets are long-lived infrastructure investments, like new gas plants built for projected data center load, that become underused or uneconomical before they are paid off, whether because demand never materializes or because policy and market shifts overtake them. Because utilities recover those costs through rates over decades, ratepayers keep paying even if the asset sits idle. The risk is acute today because data center demand forecasts are highly uncertain: Virginia regulators removed roughly $350 million tied to speculative data center projects from one utility's revenue forecast in 2025.

Why do data centers often locate in rural or low-income communities, and what are the environmental justice implications?

Data center siting favors cheap land, fast permitting, low-cost power and water, and proximity to existing generation and transmission, conditions most common in rural, low-income, and historically marginalized communities. Research confirms the consequences: analysis of 550 EPA-regulated data centers found air pollution burdens rise with the share of people of color living nearby. These communities absorb the air pollution, water stress, noise, and land use impacts while receiving few lasting jobs or direct benefits.

What regulatory or policy tools can states and Public Utility Commissions use to ensure data center growth doesn't unfairly shift costs to residential and small-business ratepayers?

The toolkit has expanded rapidly since 2025. Commissions can create dedicated large-load rate classes and tariffs with minimum take-or-pay provisions, long contract terms, collateral requirements, and exit fees, as Ohio and Virginia have done; directly assign infrastructure enhancement costs to the customers that trigger them; and require site impact assessments during permitting. Legislatures can codify ratepayer protections, require water and load-forecast transparency, and condition tax incentives on community benefits, models now in place in at least eight states.

This commentary reflects public policy analysis and opinion, not legal advice or regulatory determinations. 

This article was originally published in collaboration with the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University as part of its Energy Explained series. 

Key Takeaways

• Attention to data centers is skyrocketing in state capitals across the United States.
• In data center bills passed by state legislatures in 2025, two topics dominated: locational incentives (such as reduced sales taxes) and ratepayer protection. Many bills addressing data centers' water use and environmental risks were proposed, but few were enacted.
• Almost all the enacted bills encouraging data centers to locate in a state were passed by Republican legislatures, and more bills addressing data centers' environmental risks were proposed in Democratic legislatures than Republican legislatures. Concern about the impacts of data centers on power prices was bipartisan.

Introduction

From east to west and north to south, in red states and blue states, attention to data centers is skyrocketing in state capitals across the United States. Our research identified more than 190 bills on data centers introduced in state legislatures in the first 11 months of 2025—roughly nine times the number of such bills introduced in 2024. The bills address a wide range of topics, including economic development, ratepayer protection, grid reliability, and disclosure of data centers' energy use and environmental impacts. More than two dozen of these bills were enacted into law.

This newfound interest in data centers in state capitals is unlikely to abate anytime soon. The data center industry is growing at a staggering pace. A recent McKinsey report projected roughly $2.8 trillion in spending on data center infrastructure in the US by 2030. In 2024, data centers used roughly 4–5% of the electricity produced in the United States—a percentage projected to grow sharply in the years ahead. A rapid buildout of data centers and electricity infrastructure to support them offers economic and strategic benefits but also creates risks for ratepayers, water resources and the environment.

State policymakers are on the front lines of these issues. State governments promote economic development, regulate electricity rates and have jurisdiction over many local resource and environmental issues. Different stakeholders have strongly conflicting views on data centers, setting up high-profile debates in state capitals as well as in Washington, DC.

This blog post—the first entry in a project that will explore state data center policies, power prices and related topics—presents these findings.

Methodology: Tracking Data Center Legislation

We (the authors of this article) queried StateNet's database of state legislation to identify bills proposed between January 1 and November 30, 2025 that used several terms including "data center" and "large load." After removing bills that used those terms but addressed different issues, we categorized the remaining bills into topic areas (including tax incentives, ratepayer protection, zoning and siting, disclosure requirements, environmental protections, labor, water resources, clean energy, and research studies) as well as status (enacted, pending, rejected, and passed but vetoed). We supplemented this research with queries to ChatGPT and Gemini to help identify possible gaps in the StateNet review, double-checking links provided by those large language models to ensure the information provided was accurate.

Almost all state legislatures have now adjourned for the year. (Only six state legislatures remain in session in December.) Trends with respect to state legislative activity on data centers in the first 11 months of 2025 included the following.  

Eight Key Data Center Trends From State Legislative Activity in 2025

1. One of the most common objectives of state bills related to data centers was to encourage those facilities to locate in a state.  

• Roughly 50 bills were introduced in state legislatures offering data centers tax incentives or other benefits.  
• Of the more than two dozen bills on data centers enacted by state legislatures, at least nine provided tax incentives or other inducements for siting decisions. Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky and Minnesota, among other states, all extended or increased sales or use tax exemptions for data centers. Indiana and West Virginia, among others, established favorable zoning and fast-track permitting procedures to facilitate data center construction.

2. State legislatures are paying growing attention to the impact of data centers on power prices. Ratepayer protection and tariff rate issues were among the most popular topics for state legislation on data centers. More than 40 such bills were proposed and at least six such bills passed. Those included:

• Minnesota HF 16, which requires new large grid customers (including data centers), as a group, to cover all their grid costs;
• Texas SB 6, which requires the Texas Public Utility Commission "to support business development in this state while minimizing the potential for stranded infrastructure costs;" and  
• New Jersey A5466 and California SB 57, both of which require the state PUC to study within one year the effect of data centers on electricity costs.

3. Many bills related to the environmental impacts of data centers were introduced in state legislatures, including approximately 30 bills related to water consumption. Only a few of these bills were enacted. Minnesota HF 16, for example, requires close attention to water use in permitting new data centers. Kansas SB 98 makes tax credits for data centers contingent on practices that will "conserve, reuse and replace water."

4. Approximately 40 bills were introduced requiring data centers to disclose their energy use and/or environmental impacts to state authorities, with roughly a dozen bills requiring disclosure to the public. Details regarding metrics and anonymization of reports varied widely. At least three of these disclosure-related bills were enacted, including the following.

• Texas SB 6 requires interconnection applicants to disclose whether they are pursuing other interconnection applications in the state as well as information on onsite back-up generating facilities.
• Minnesota HF 16 requires data centers to disclose information on water consumption volumes.
• Iowa HB 976 requires data centers to submit an annual report to the Department of Revenue detailing the amount of backup power generation fuel and electricity purchased.

5. Several states passed bills limiting tax benefits for data centers.

Iowa limited sales tax exemptions for new data centers to 10 or 15 years (depending on their size), and Florida raised the minimum size for data centers receiving sales tax exemptions from 15 megawatts (MW) to 100 MW.  

6. Texas became the first state in the nation to pass a bill requiring data center operators to enable remote disconnections for use during grid emergencies (referred to as a "kill switch provision").

7. There is little consistency in the legislative text of state bills on data centers.

• Definitions of data centers, thresholds for incentives, and regulations related to disclosure, zoning, siting, environmental impact mitigation and ratepayer protection vary significantly.
• This may be the expected product of variance among state-level policy regimes, and suggests the absence of close coordination among state legislatures or stakeholder groups.

8. The pattern of proposed and enacted bills displayed some partisan patterns.

Almost all the enacted bills encouraging data centers to locate in a state were passed by Republican legislatures. More bills addressing environmental risks from data centers were proposed in Democratic legislatures than Republican legislatures. However bills concerning the impacts of data centers on other ratepayers were enacted in states with Democratic legislatures and governors (including California, New Jersey and Oregon), Republican legislatures and governors (including Texas and Utah) and in which the legislature is controlled by one party and the governor another (including Kansas).

Data centers will be a hot topic as many state legislatures reconvene in January. The Executive Order on state AI laws released by the White House December 11 2025 does not seek to preempt state laws related to data centers (see in particular Section 8b), however questions related to the optimal role of state governments and the federal government on AI and data centers will likely be prominent as well.